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ln this article the author argues that despite 
its popularity among researchers and man- 
agers alike, Risk Analysis as a management 
tool has not been successful. He postulates 
that in the end managers will give up 
attempting to make formal analysis of risks, 
substituting more effective means of living 
with the ‘results’ of those risks as they arise. 
I N SPITE OF THE MYRIAD OF TOOLS AND METHOD- ologies developed in the management sciences 
over the past decade, it is probably safe to say that 
the methodology of risk analysis for evaluating 
capital investment decisions has generated the most 
excitement among researchers and managers alike. 
While a number of researchers and a few companies 
were promoting this tool before 1964, the popu- 
larity of risk analysis accelerated after David 
Hertz’ wrote his now ‘classic’ article, where he 
concluded : 
In actual practice, however, the conventional methods (for 
evaluating capital investments) do not work out satis- 
factorily. Why? The reason, as we have seen earlier in 
this article, and as every executive and economist knows, is 
that the estimates used in making the advance calculations 
are just that-estimates. More accurate estimates would 
be helpful, but at best the residual uncertainty can easily 
make a mockery of corporate hopes. Nevertheless, there 
is a solution. To collect realistic estimates for the key 
factors means to find out a great deal about them. Hence, 
the kind of uncertainty that is involved in each estimate 
can be evaluated ahead of time. Using this knowledge of 
uncertainty, executives can maximize the value of the 
information for decision making. 
The value of computer programs in developing clear 
portrayals of the uncertainty and risk surrounding alter- 
native investments has been proved. Such programs can 
produce valuable information about the sensitivity of the 
possible outcomes to the variability of input factors and 
to the likelihood of achieving various possible rates of 
return. This information can be extremely important as a 
backup to management judgment. To have calculations of 
the odds on all possible outcomes lends some assurance 
to the decision makers that the available information has 
been used with maximum efficiency. 
Since the Hertz article, risk analysis has been 
heavily promoted as a tool for improving the 
evaluation of investments in research and develop- 
ment, new products, new facilities, mergers and 
acquisitions, and other strategic decisions faced by 
the modem business firm. During the past decade, 
almost all graduates of MBA programs have 
obtained a working knowledge of the tool.* Most 
large corporations have sent their managers and 
planners to seminars on the subject. Computer 
programs to implement the procedure have 
appeared on almost all commercial time-sharing 
systems, and many companies have developed these 
programs for their specialized internal applications. 
Indeed, some companies have even changed their 
capital investment procedures to require a risk 
analysis evaluation as a part of all capital appro- 
priation requests. One writer on the subject has 
even suggested that risk analysis may ultimately 
become the ‘slide rule of the corporate executive’. 
During this same period, academic researchers 
have developed more sophisticated models and 
management procedures for implementing risk 
analysis. Techniques for eliciting the subjective 
probabilities and utility functions necessary for a 
comprehensive risk analysis have been proposed 
and refined,’ and financial theorists are currently 
attempting to link risk analysis with capital struc- 
ture analysis, leading to a revised theory of business 
decision-making under uncertainty.3 
All of this enthusiasm for risk analysis has not 
gone unchallenged. For example, in a study of the 
implementation problems encountered with risk 
analysis in four firms in the oil industry, Carter4 
has tried to delineate those factors which have 
‘Indeed, there is some evidence that they have learned 
their lessons well. When faced with a case-study situation 
where one of the issues was whether to develop a deter- 
ministic or probabilistic long range planning model, 17 out 
of 28 of this author’s students in a recent class opted for 
the probabilistic model on the grounds that it would be 
more ‘realistic’ and provide more ‘information’ for manage- 
ment. 
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helped a hindered successful implementation. He 
suggests that the degree of success with risk analysis 
will depend on the 
: 
How mature was the risk analysis technique when each 
company decided to use it ? 
What were the origins of the decision to adopt it? 
How was it fitted in with company organization? 
How were the managers who were supposed to use and 
benefit from the technique prepared for handling it? 
How were the data generated, and how were they put 
together in model form? 
What role did top management reserve for itself in deciding 
to install risk analysis? 
Whom did top management assign to shepherd the project 
along? 
In addition, Carter offers some problems in- 
herent in any application of risk analysis : 
The company must decide what, exactly, risk analysis can 
do for it-it must see that the relevance of risk analysis to 
the decisions its managers must make is carefully spelled 
out. 
For the technique to work, various kinds of assessments of 
risks and probabilities must be obtained from individual 
managers. This is not easy to do. 
Once the assessments, the data, and the conclusions that 
can be drawn from them are clear, managers must trade 
off risk against return in a more or less structured way. 
Again, this presents a real problem. 
Procedures for evaluating and controlling projects must 
be adjusted for some of the after-effects of risk analysis. 
Company problems and solution procedures must be 
brought into close alignment-otherwise the technique 
just cannot work. 
In another study of the impact of risk analysis on 
decision-making with the firm, Root’ has examined 
the role of this tool in new product planning. He 
comments : 
The usual argument for using a risk analysis approach is 
that a firm attempting to decide whether to make a major 
financial commitment to a new product must consider 
and compare many alternatives, and to do this properly 
there should be an assessment of risk rather than the use 
of only single-point estimates. Although this philosophy 
seems incontrovertible, there is no evidence of any great 
rush to accept this theoretically better method. The 
reason, of course, is the impossibility of demonstrating 
in practice that such a technique will lead to better 
decisions or improved profits. 
The intent in this paper is to take yet another 
look at the real impact of risk analysis on capital 
investment planning. The basic conclusion is that 
risk analysis is not having-and will not have-a 
measurable, positive impact on the planning pro- 
cess in large firms. This conclusion is drawn from 
empirical observations from two sources : 
(1) In depth studies of the decision-making process 
leading to major new product investments in 
four ‘Fortune 500’ manufacturing firms. Two 
of these firms were attempting to use risk 
analysis in the evaluation of capital investments, 
and the other two were studying the technique 
for possible future implementation. 
(2) Interviews with senior managers in 12 large 
firms operating as either manufacturing, utility, 
or financial institutions. In all these firms, 
management was aware of risk analysis, and a 
limited attempt had been made to apply the tool 
to an experimental basis in almost half. 
There is no way to characterize this sample of 
firms, projects, and managers as a random sample 
of current industrial practice.* However, in discuss- 
ing this study with other managers in other firms, 
this author has some reason to believe that the 
observed practices and subsequent impressions and 
conclusions are representative of the state of the 
art. 
In none of the firms studies was there evidence 
that the application of risk analysis was improving 
or could improve the capital investment evaluation 
process. In fact, in several of the firms which were 
attempting risk analysis, there was a strong feeling 
on the part of managers that the company should 
return to deterministic financial evaluations. (This 
eventually happened in two of the companies in 
this sample.) 
The conclusion that risk analysis is not working 
-and probably will not work-will come as a 
disturbing finding to those researchers and staff 
analysts who have been promoting the tool. Indeed, 
some staff analysts in some of the firms in this 
author’s sample and a number of academicians will 
argue with these findings. Their argument goes 
roughly as follows: 
At the present stage of development, risk analysis may be 
too sophisticated for senior managers who were not trained 
in the modern business sciences. However, as new, better- 
trained managers come along, and as the complexities and 
uncertainties of the business environment grow, successful 
implementation will also grow. 
Unfortunately, it is a part of this argument-the 
complexity and uncertainty of the future business 
environment-which will work against risk analysis 
in the long run, not for it! In addition, the internal 
decision-making mechanisms of the modern busi- 
ness firm operating in this rapidly changing environ- 
ment make-and will continue to make-risk 
analysis a tool of very limited applicability in im- 
proving the capital investment process. The intent 
in this paper is to elaborate on this point and to 
offer some positive guidance for those who are 
attempting to improve the capital investment 
process. 
THE UNCERTAINTY OF UNCERTAINTY 
Theoretically, the idea of quantifying uncertain 
elements in decision-making is hard to dispute- 
both on the grounds that this procedure brings 
more information into the analysis and on the 
grounds that the procedure makes assumptions and 
‘In all cases the companies studied have insisted that their 
identities and specific corporate practices not be divulged. 
However, all were leaders in their industry and are con- 
sidered to be progressive and well-managed. 
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differences of opinion explicit. In practice, however, 
the idea fails on at least two grounds: 
(1) The decision as to who should quantify 
uncertainty and how this should be done. 
(2) The decision as to what uncertainties should be 
quantified. 
We shall return to the first question later, elaborat- 
ing on the second issue at this time. 
As the rate of change and complexity of the 
business environment grows, the uncertainty of 
uncertain events must also grow. Toffle@ makes this 
point clearly in his recent best-selling book : 
In the face of such an upheaval (in the purposes of 
economic activity), even the most sophisticated tools of 
today’s economists are helpless. Input-output tables, 
econometric models-the whole paraphernalia of analysis 
that economists employ simply do not come to grips with 
the external forces-political, social, and ethical-that will 
transform economic life in the decades before us. 
In addition, a large number of specific examples 
are available to support this premise with respect to 






A large, integrated mining company conducted 
a relatively sophisticated risk analysis in 
attempting to evaluate a new processing venture. 
Ranges for future costs, volumes, and revenues 
were carefully elicited and the liklihoods of 
various values within these ranges were 
quantified. However, the asset life was assumed 
to be deterministic (20 years in this case) and 
4 years after the project was approved, the 
processing venture was seized by a foreign 
government. 
In analyzing future foreign investments in the 
late 196Os, at least one major oil company 
interviewed by this author (and probably many 
others) neglected to consider and quantify what 
has turned out to be the dominant risk in 
industry investment planning-the Middle 
East political situation. 
As far as this author has been able to determine, 
the risks of the explosive inflation in the United 
States in 1973 were not adequately quantified 
in any sector-including the Government. 
Indeed, one senior economic advisor has 
admitted, ‘This inflation is very disconcerting 
. . . it took us by surprise.’ 
As recently as the early summer of 1973, 
senior automobile executives were not even 
considering a major domestic energy problem 
in their investment planning-let alone quanti- 
fying this risk. Nevertheless, everyone in the 
industry today will admit that this is now the 
biggest risk faced by the industry and that 
different investment decisions would have been 
made had this risk been properly assessed at 
any earlier date. 
During the early 197Os, the risks of raw material 
supply shortages were not considered in capital 
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investment planning by any of the firms in this 
sample. However, today these risks (along with 
the energy problem) dominate future profit- 
ability calculations for almost all investment 
decisions. 
It is easy, of course, to disregard these experiences 
as examples of poor planning. Yet managers and 
analysts in each of these situations claim unani- 
mously that ‘we had no warning . . . the world has 
changed and is changing in a way it has never 
changed before’. 
The point here is that the future will be different 
from the past and that past and present experiences 
will become increasingly less relevant in predicting 
the future. More important, those events which are 
not and cannot be predicted will have an increas- 
ingly larger impact on the future outcomes of 
current decisions. Indeed, it is likely that the world 
of the future will have more and more managers 
trapped by this proverbial law: ‘If its not planned 
for, it will happen.’ 
If we accept the promise of the uncertainty of 
future uncertainty, then risk analysis is very likely 
to result in a ‘type three error’-an elaborate 
attempt to resolve the wrong problem. It is certainly 
becoming more and more difficult to argue that 
limited managerial resources should be allocated to 
the careful and precise quantification of un- 
certainty, when the real risk is that the wrong risks 
will be quantified. And there is growing evidence 
that senior managers who reject the sophistication 
of risk analysis have in fact accepted the promise 
of future uncertainty. Consider, for instance, the 
following comments recently made by a senior vice 
president in the automotive industry. 
“In planning for strategic investments today, the only real 
important questions are the ones you can’t answer. . . . As 
much as we want to talk about this planning process with 
poly syllabic words and the like, in the end you still made 
the decision by taking a hell of a gamble.” 
THE MYTH OF THE DECISION-MAKER 
Unfortunately, even if our mythical crystal ball 
were suddenly to improve to the point where we 
could predict future uncertainties-let alone the 
future-risk analysis still won’t work. This is 
because the tool conflicts with the internal decision- 
making mechanisms in today’s large organization. 
Consider, for example, the question as to whose 
subjective probabilities and utility functions should 
be elicited in a risk analysis. The typical answer is 
the ‘decision-maker’s’, for example, as Brown’ puts 
it, ‘personalistic decisions analysis consists of 
modeling what an executive has in his head and 
thereby seeks to impose some logical consistency 
to his decision making’. 
The problem is that investment decisions in large 
organizations are not made by an executive or even 
a committee of executives. Instead the process is 
governed by the sequential interactions of many 
parties in the organizational hierarchy. While top 
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management may make the final ‘go-no go’ deci- 
sion, the inputs to this binary process have been 
massaged and shaped to the point where the ulti- 
mate decision is almost always routine and in many 
cases even automatic. In addition, a number of 
researchers* have noted that the inputs to this 
process arise sequentially from all levels of the 
organization. Indeed, one can find a great deal of 
support for the argument that investment policy 
is shaped through the alternatives lower level 
managers choose to ‘serve up’ to senior manage- 
ment-even in those organizations where planning 
is supposed to be centralized at the senior executive 
level. 
THE PROCESS OF INVESTMENT 
PLANNING 
This ‘diffuse’ process of investment planning in the 
modern firm, molded by the bottom up support of 
a limited set of alternatives, has some significant 
effects on risk-taking. First of all, as Bower9 has 
observed; ‘a plan is something a network of 
managers wants to do because it is in their interest 
to do so’. As a result, the numbers used to support 
a project will reflect commitment to the project, 
and these will change as this commitment varies. In 
at least two situations studied by this author, inputs 
into a risk analysis model were consciously changed 
by project analysts, thereby changing the model 
outputs in an effort to sway commitments at other 
organizational levels. (It is important to understand 
that the numbers used to justify an investment 
project were not changed over time to sabotage the 
project or the technique of analysis; they were 
changed to get the project approved. These changes 
might be upward or downward, and in all cases they 
could be justified as ‘reasonable estimates’.) Since 
this is the way numbers evolve in the ‘real world’, it 
seems senseless to develop more sophisticated and 
more expensive ways of eliciting and massaging 
these numbers. 
The process of decision making in the real world 
affects risk taking behavior in other ways. In fact, 
it can be argued that the firms studied in this 
project did not take risks-instead they devised 
procedures for dividing, delaying, and sharing the 
risks inherent in the new products being considered. 
Risks were divided in the sense that financial 
sponsorship was requested only for the narrowly- 
defined tasks to be undertaken between formal 
project reviews. While formal and informal long 
range plans existed (at least on paper), these were 
de-emphasized in favor of short range, tactical plans 
in requesting funding. The problem, of course, is 
that these sequences of short-range fundings even- 
tually led to the point where major commitments 
must be made. In some of the firms studied, inte- 
grating management was aware that these decision 
points were coming, but they were unprepared to 
act when they arrived. The result was ‘risk delaying’, 
where major decisions were held in limbo while 
political, economic and technological uncertainties 
resolved themselves. This ‘holding’ period was 
frequently of long duration-more than 10 years 
for a major product investment in one of the firms 
examined. It always ended when the overall level 
of commitment to the project changed-either 
through a change in management or a change in 
the business environment. As one senior manager 
in a large manufacturing firm put it, ‘Usually the 
way that decisions get made in our firm is that we 
wait so long the decision gets made for us . . . it 
becomes a simple matter of survival.’ It is interest- 
ing to note that these subsequent changes in commit- 
ment to the investment project under consideration 
were unforeseen at the inception of the project- 
amplifying again some of the uncertainties of 
uncertainty. 
Superimposed on this entire process was ‘risk 
sharing’ among members of the organization. The 
diffuseness of decision making in the formal product 
planning and review process was such that no one 
person could take all the blame if things went bad, 
but everyone could claim most of the credit when 
things went right-supporting again the myth of 
the well-identified decision-maker in the modern 
business firm. 
SOME IMPLICATIONS 
There is little argument that analysis should be a 
part of the investment process-if for no other 
reason than, as Easton” puts it: 
(1) Businessmen want to be normative. 
(2) Important decision must be defensible. 
(3) The numbers form a common language for 
communication. 
Still, in the face of uncertain uncertainties and a 
diffuse, commitment-oriented process of investment 
planning in large firms, this author has become 
convinced that risk analysis results in oversophisti- 
cated ‘over-kill’. 
In the end the numbers associated with a project 
are likely to reflect the outcome of the planning 
process-not the inputs to the process. In addition, 
future uncertainties almost always guarantee that 
these numbers will be proven wrong. Consequently, 
it would appear that simple, straightforward 
deterministic analysis of capital investments is 
sufficient to provide the numbers necessary to 
balance individual commitments against corporate 
well-being in an unstable and rapidly changing 
environment. In fact, there may even be an inherent 
danger in applying risk analysis in such an environ- 
ment. Quantification-even unbiased quantifica- 
tion-of the wrong risks is apt to lead to ‘tunnel 
vision’-diverting management attention from an 
open consideration of fundamental risks and other 
options. If this occurs the application of risk 
analysis narrows the information base instead of 
broadening it. 
More important, however, is the fact that the 
particular methodology of analysis is less significant 
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than the overall process of intra-firm decision- 
making and the process of implementing subse- 
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